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Abstract
This article is the third in a series of reports called Pilot Source Study 2015. In 2010, when the U.S. Congress considered dramatic
changes to airline pilot qualifications, researchers from the ‘‘Pilot Source Study 2010’’ sampled pilots from six regional airlines to
investigate how pilots’ backgrounds affected their performance in airline training. In 2012, when the FAA proposed rulemaking to
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implement Public Law 111-216, the ‘‘Pilot Source Study 2012’’ researchers repeated the study with a new sample of pilots from seven
different regional airlines. Data from these two studies were combined into a Pre-Law dataset. On August 1, 2013, the mandates of PL
111-216 became effective, ushering in the Post-Law era. The Pilot Source Study 2015 consists of three articles that cover the 19 U.S.
regional airlines operating under 14 CFR Part 121. This report (Article 3) compares pilots’ training outcomes between Pre-Law and PostLaw to determine whether their backgrounds had a stronger or weaker influence on Post-Law outcomes. Background variables were
segmented into: (a) educational backgrounds, which occur early when pilots obtain their certificates and (b) experience backgrounds,
which occur later when pilots accumulate flight time before applying to a regional airline. When comparing the Pre-Law and Post-Law
data, educational backgrounds generally had less effect on airline training outcomes. Experience backgrounds also generally had less
effect on airline training outcomes, with these exceptions: (a) previous airline and corporate experience had a more positive effect on extra
training events, and (b) previous corporate experience had a more positive effect on completions. In conclusion, the congressionally
mandated gap between earning pilot certificates and beginning airline training has reduced the positive effects of pilots’ educational and
experience backgrounds.
Keywords: Pilot Source Study, Public Law 111-216, Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations, FOQ Rule, 14 CFR
Part 121, ATP, R-ATP, pilot hiring, pilot training, first officer, transportation law, Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act,
airline pilot, new-hire pilot, flight hours, AABI, operating experience, recurrent training

Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2009 crash of Colgan Air Flight
3407 (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB],
2010), Congress unanimously passed the Airline Safety
and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of
2010. That law, also known as Public Law 111-216, went
into full effect on August 1, 2013. The new law suspended
career opportunities for many low-time pilots and has made
it challenging for airlines to find qualified pilot applicants
(McGee, 2015). Previously, air carriers certificated under
14 CFR Part 121 (Operating Requirements: Domestic,
Flag, and Supplemental Operations, 2015) could employ first
officers who held a Commercial Pilot certificate, without any
minimum age or specified flight hours beyond the requirements for the Commercial Pilot certificate. The new law
dramatically changed the requirements for entry-level air
carrier pilots; it required first officers to possess the Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with minima of 1,500 flight
hours and 23 years of age.
In 2010 and 2012, teams of Pilot Source Study researchers, reacting to these changes and their potential impact,
collected convenience sample data from regional airlines on
the source characteristics (background) of newly hired
pilots and the subsequent performance of those pilots in air
carrier operations, in the era before the new law (Smith,
Bjerke, NewMyer, Niemczyk, & Hamilton, 2010; Smith
et al., 2013). At the time of publication, the 2010 and 2012
research helped answer the following questions: Where do
regional pilots come from? How were they originally
trained? And, once hired, how did they perform? The
research conducted in 2010 and 2012 (Pre-Law) serves as a
benchmark for comparison with the same questions about
pilots in the era after the new law took effect (Post-Law).
In January, 2015, representatives at the Pilot Supply and
Demand Summit (Roddey, 2015) discussed the need for
a new Pilot Source Study to examine the background,

qualifications, and performance of new first officers (PostLaw pilots hired after the August 1, 2013 effective date of
Public Law 111-216). During the summer of 2015, when
Public Law 111-216 and the related Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulation, Pilot Certification and
Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations
(FOQ Rule) (FAA, 2013, July 15), had been in place for
approximately two years, members of the research team
traveled across the US from April to October, 2015 and
visited 19 Part 121 regional airlines and three Part 135
regional airlines. Extensive background, training, and operational data were collected from de-identified airline records
of over 7,000 pilots hired since the new law took effect.
The resulting effort represents the largest and most detailed
investigation of entry-level airline pilots conducted to date.
This article is the third in a series of reports on those datasets,
collectively known as the Pilot Source Study 2015.
In the first report of the Pilot Source Study 2015 (Bjerke
et al., 2016), the researchers described the backgrounds
of pilots hired by the 19 Part 121 regional airlines since
August 1, 2013—the date Public Law 111-216 became
effective. This first report detailed the backgrounds of
airline pilots hired in the Post-Law era and compared their
backgrounds to those of pilots hired in the Pre-Law era.
The second report (Smith, G. et al., 2016) examined the
performance of the Post-Law new-hire pilots as they began
their airline careers, following them from their initial airline
training through becoming fully qualified regional airline
pilots. This third report compares the performance of the
Pre-Law pilots (using data from Smith et al., 2010; 2013)
with the Post-Law pilots (using data from Smith, G. et al.,
2016) who were subject to the new Part 121 pilot hiring
rules. When PL 111-216 went into effect and the true implications were realized, many industry professionals registered
concerns about unintended consequences of the Public Law
that could have an adverse effect on training and the pilot
supply. This report provides data and analyses to investigate
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the following basic questions: How has PL 111-216 affected
the pilot training and hiring environment? How has PL 111216 affected the costs to the regional airlines of training
today’s pilots? Which group has performed better: the PreLaw pilots or the Post-Law pilots?
Data collected for each of the Pilot Source Studies came
solely from de-identified airline records; no pilots were
contacted, interviewed, or surveyed. An important fact is
that airlines are not required to maintain detailed records of
individual pilot performance; many airlines retain only the
minimum information required by the FAA. As a result,
information in airline training records differs widely among
airlines. When data from numerous airlines are combined
into one dataset, many of the records’ details are lost because
of the non-uniformity among the records. As a result, paucity
of data is sometimes a deterrent to comprehensive data collection and analysis.
All of the Pilot Source Studies (2010, 2012, and 2015)
have important limitations. The researchers collected background and performance data on pilots who were hired by
the regional airlines, both Pre-Law and Post-Law. These
data were analyzed as source studies, not supply studies.
No attempt was made to predict future pilot supply. Moreover, the researchers made no predictions or assumptions
related to the future performance of these pilots in line
operations, based on the data collected on pilot background
and performance during regional airline new-hire classes.
Research Question
The first report of Pilot Source Study 2015 (Bjerke et al.,
2016) described the backgrounds of the Post-Law pilots
and compared them to the backgrounds of Pre-Law pilots.
The second report (Smith, G. et al., 2016) analyzed the
performance of the Post-Law pilots in airline training and
operating experience to determine whether there was a
difference in pilot performance, based on their backgrounds. This third report is a comparison of the pilot
outcomes between the Pre-Law data (Pilot Source Study
2010 and 2012) and the Post-Law data (Pilot Source Study
2015) to determine whether the background variables had a
stronger effect on Pre-Law outcomes or Post-Law outcomes. Thus, this study sought to answer the following
research question:

N In Part 121 regional airlines, how does the success of
the Post-Law pilots compare to the success of the PreLaw pilots—considering the differences in their background characteristics?
Review of the Literature
In February of 2009, Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in
Buffalo, New York, resulting in 49 fatalities aboard the
airplane and one fatality on the ground (NTSB, 2010). The
NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident

was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of
the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from
which the airplane did not recover (NTSB). Public Law
111-216, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, was unanimously passed by
Congress in the aftermath of the 2009 crash and signed by
President Obama on August 1, 2010. The resulting FAA
Regulation (FAA, 2013, July 15), FOQ Rule, went into full
effect on August 1, 2013. Public responses to the law have
been generally positive. The Families of Continental Flight
3407 (Families, 2016), representing families directly affected by the crash, have expressed their approval of the law
and publicize their roles in influencing its passage. Prior to
passage of the law, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
International (Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA], 2012)
released a document praising the FAA Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding the eventual passage of PL 111-216.
In addition, the Allied Pilots Association (APA) has also
been a strong proponent for the law, stating: ‘‘APA was an
aggressive advocate for increasing minimum standards for
first officers, which became law last year’’ (Allied Pilots
Association [APA], 2014, p. 1).
A number of papers have been published in response to
congressional action leading up to PL 111-216, including a
series of Pilot Source Studies similar to the research reported herein. The overarching goal of these studies has been
to understand how pilot backgrounds affect their performance in the regional airlines. The first ‘‘Pilot Source Study
2010’’ (Smith et al., 2010) found that ‘‘[s]tatistically, the
best performing pilots were those who had flight instructor certificates, graduated from collegiate accredited flight
programs, received advanced (post-private) pilot training
in college, graduated with collegiate aviation degrees (any
aviation discipline), and had between 500 and 1,000 preemployment flight hours’’ (p. 73). The second ‘‘Pilot Source
Study 2012’’ (Smith et al., 2013) continued the work from
Smith and colleagues (2010) with a different dataset and
reached similar conclusions.
In January 2015, a Pilot Supply and Demand Summit
was held at Daytona Beach, Florida to assess the impact of
PL 111-216 on regional airline pilot hiring (Roddey, 2015).
The Summit was attended by representatives from regional
airlines, major airlines, government, and academia, who
determined that the Pilot Source Study should be repeated
to investigate the impact of PL 111-216 on pilot hiring and
training in U.S. regional airlines. The new research project,
Pilot Source Study 2015, was commissioned to compare
the backgrounds of new-hire regional airline first officers
who were hired prior to implementation of PL 111-216 to
those of first officers hired after that law came into effect.
The first report of Pilot Source Study 2015 (Bjerke et al.,
2016) compared the background characteristics of pilots
hired before and after PL 111-216. The second report of
Pilot Source Study 2015 (Smith, G. et al., 2016) investigated the performance of the new group of pilots hired after
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PL 111-216 became effective. Smith, G. and colleagues
(2016) utilized four performance measures for this group
of pilots: Non-Completions, Extra Training, Extra Initial
Operating Experience (IOE), and Extra Recurrent Training. Smith, G. and colleagues (2016) found that ‘‘pilots
who had the fewest Non-Completions and required less
Extra Training were recent college graduates (less than or
equal to 4 years since graduation), pilots with lower total
flight times (1,500 flight hours or less), and pilots who
graduated from flight programs accredited by the Aviation
Accreditation Board International (AABI)’’ (p. 2).
The U.S. aviation industry is beginning to experience the
consequences of an issue widely disputed among industry professionals—a pilot shortage. Regional airlines are
beginning to discontinue service to smaller cities, including
those subsidized by the FAA Essential Air Service (EAS)
program (Silk, 2016, January 19). Regional airline pilots
are now being hired by the major carriers, and the regional
airlines are having difficulty hiring qualified pilots to fly
the aircraft that have serviced these cities in the past (Silk,
2016, January 19). The impact of this pilot shortage is
exemplified by the recent filing for Chapter 11 reorganization by Republic Airways Holdings, owner of both Republic Airline and Shuttle America Corporation. In their press
release, Republic’s chairman, president, and CEO, Bryan
Bedford, stated one of the reasons for the bankruptcy filing
was the loss of revenue from aircraft groundings due to the
lack of pilot resources (Church, Schlangenstein, & Sasso,
2016, February 26). The reason for this shortage is a subject with multiple opinions among industry stakeholders.
ALPA (2016) places the regional airlines at fault because of
their low compensation. McGee (2015), using a comprehensive supply-and-demand model of U.S. pilots, found
‘‘there will not be a civilian system-wide pilot shortage in
the near-term, though the system will become strained.
Low-paying airlines will continue to have difficulties
finding qualified pilots’’ (p. iii). Salaries of regional airline
pilots are not simple to change; they are curtailed by
contracts between regional airlines and their mainline
carrier partners and by pilot collective bargaining agreements (‘‘The Coming U.S. Pilot Shortage Is Real,’’ 2015).
The opposing opinion argues the problem is a shortage
of pilots due to a combination of the effects of PL 111216, retiring pilots, U.S. pilots flying for foreign carriers,
and an expanding industry (Silk, 2016, January 4). In a
study forecasting airline pilot demand, Higgins, Bjerke,
Lovelace, and Leonard (2016) noted that the larger major
carriers are not likely to experience any shortage in the next
three years; however, the regional carriers already have
indications of a pilot shortage. According to Higgins and
colleagues (2016), the current forecast calls for a shortage
of over 14,000 major airline pilots in the US between 2016
and 2026.
The implementation of PL 111-216 has had major
impacts on airline pilot hiring. The new law requires that all
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pilots utilized for Part 121 Scheduled Airline Operations
possess an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, which
requires 1,500 total flight hours, compared to a Commercial
Pilot certificate that requires 250 flight hours for certification. The FOQ Rule has provided exceptions to the 1,500
total flight hours requirement. The flight hours are reduced
to a minimum of 1,250 for graduates completing an associate or bachelor’s aviation degree with at least 30 credits
of approved coursework from an approved school; 1,000
flight hours for graduates completing an aviation bachelor’s
degree with at least 60 credits of an approved curriculum
from an approved school; and 750 flight hours for military
pilots (FAA, 2013, July 15).
While ALPA (2016) may argue that qualified pilots exist
to fill these positions, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) (U.S. General Accountability Office [GAO],
2014) noted that the large pool of ATP certificate holders
can include pilots who are not available, not suitable, or not
competent. Moreover, university pilot programs appear to
be experiencing a decline in enrollments and graduations
(GAO, 2014). These pilot training programs are essential
to maintain the pilot supply and subsequently the U.S.
aviation industry. Depperschmidt, Bliss, and Casebolt
(2015) reported that collegiate aviation training institution
respondents to a survey were ‘‘concerned that as a result of
PL 111-216, programmatic and training costs will increase,
recruitment and retention of student pilots will be adversely
affected, and overall, the law will be detrimental to collegiate aviation flight training programs’’ (p. 1). If the pipeline has indeed been damaged, it is imperative for the
aviation industry to understand why and repair the damage
before the industry (and the traveling public) feels the full
effect.
With the passing of PL 111-216, the pilot supply pipeline
has been tasked with overcoming a demanding hurdle at an
inopportune time, when air travel is expanding and a generation of pilots is retiring at an increasing rate (Creedy, 2016,
February 4). Boeing (2015) forecasted a need for 558,000
new pilots worldwide by 2034, and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) estimated a new pilot deficit
of 160,000 by 2030, due to lack of training capacity (International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 2011).
A career as an airline pilot has been regarded as one of
the most respected professions since the invention of the
airplane. Most pilots are very passionate about their profession. The flight environment is always different; it is stimulating, interesting, and can be extremely rewarding (The
Truth about the Profession, 2016). Moreover, airline pilots
can enjoy travel benefits for themselves and their families
with the possibility of free, or nearly free, travel by air.
However, low pay, high academic debt, and quality of life
issues can dissuade people from pursuing a career as an
airline pilot (Carey, 2015).
Because of the acute shortage of qualified pilots, several
regional airlines have been offering signing and retention
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bonuses. Templeton (2016) noted that some regional airlines
were offering $5,000 toward tuition reimbursement and
$6,000 as a retention bonus. Several airlines are offering
signing bonuses, ranging from $5,000 to $12,500. One airline is offering an $80,000 four-year pilot retention program
(Templeton, 2016).
Several regional airlines have been developing pipeline programs with flight schools and colleges across the
country. Candidates for these programs who have earned a
Commercial Pilot certificate and instrument rating can be
interviewed while still in school (Envoy, 2016). If selected,
candidates are considered hired by the airline and enter
a structured path toward the regional airline, usually by
building flight hours as flight instructors until they meet the
airline’s minimum flight hour requirement. The candidates
accepted to the programs are offered tuition reimbursement,
placement as flight instructors, and other support as they
reach various certification milestones. Tuition reimbursement can ultimately reach up to $16,000 (Silk, 2016,
January 22). When the minimum requirements are met,
candidates are placed in the next available airline ground
school and are usually offered bonus compensation for
joining the airline. Some regional airlines also offer nointerview, seniority-based promotions toward major airlines
(Silk, 2016, January 22).
As one example of a pipeline program, JetBlue Airways is planning to offer an ab initio pilot training program (Schlangenstein, 2015). JetBlue will hire individuals
selected for this program with no pilot experience and
train them to become professional pilots. Recruits must take
academic classes at JetBlue before moving to a partner
company to gain the required 1,500 flight hours. They will
then return to New York-based JetBlue, or can apply at
another airline. Prospective pilots would pay for their own
training. The pilot unions are opposed to JetBlue’s initiative,
claiming ‘‘there are thousands of pilots available that have
higher qualifications right now than any pilot coming out of
an ab initio program’’ (Schlangenstein, 2015, p. 1).
Whether a pilot shortage exists or not continues to be
debated. To resolve this controversy, there is a need for an
empirical study to determine the pilot supply for regional
airlines. The Pilot Source Studies are not pilot supply studies.
These distinct studies have many differences; most notably,
they have categorically different populations. The population
of a pilot supply study for regional airlines would consist of
all pilots eligible to be hired by any regional airline. The
population of the Pilot Source Studies consists of pilots
already hired by a regional airline.
Methodology
In the first report of Pilot Source Study 2015, Bjerke and
colleagues (2016) described the data collection methods for
the Post-Law dataset in detail. A brief summary of the
methodology is repeated in this third report. The Pilot

Source Study 2015 (titled the Post-Law study to distinguish
it from the 2010/2012 Pre-Law Pilot Source Studies) originated from the January 2015 Pilot Supply and Demand
Summit (Roddey, 2015) at which representatives from the
regional airlines, major airlines, government, and academia
identified a need for an empirical study of the effects of PL
111-216 on pilot hiring and pilot training in U.S. regional
airlines. This study was originally designed as a convenience
sample of the airlines that participated in the Pre-Law
studies; however, airline representatives at the May 2015
Regional Airline Association (RAA, 2015) Convention in
Cleveland, OH were so receptive that this study was redesigned as a population study—to collect data at all of the U.S.
regional airlines on all pilots hired after August 1, 2013.
From April to October, 2015, a team of data collectors visited 22 U.S. regional airlines (19 Part 121 airlines and three
Part 135 airlines) and collected 7,081 records of pilots hired
since the effective date of PL 111-216. Data collectors extracted data from human resource records (applications, resumes,
etc.) that are the independent variables—the background
(source) or predictor variables in the Pilot Source Study 2015.
Data collectors also extracted data from training records and
operational records that are the dependent variables—the
outcome or success variables in the Pilot Source Study 2015.
The two elements that enabled data collection were (a) a
nondisclosure agreement that guaranteed the data would not
be used for any purpose other than the Pilot Source Study
2015, and (b) the de-identification of all data that required the
data collection manager to remove all identifying information
(name, ID number, gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) from the data
before it was released by the airline.
The datasets from the 19 Part 121 airlines are the subject
of articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Pilot Source Study 2015. The
datasets from the three Part 135 airlines are the subject of
Article 4 of the Pilot Source Study 2015. Since pilot records
are not standardized across airlines, the task following data
collection was to consolidate the 19 disparate datasets into
a single dataset for analysis. In combining datasets, some
granularity was lost by merging and coding data from dissimilar data collected at the regional airlines. The data were
analyzed by seven researchers; each has a scholarly record
and a principled reputation. The researchers individually
analyzed the data and negotiated the differences in weekly
conference calls until there was consensus on the results. The
intent is to publish the four articles of the Pilot Source Study
2015 in an open access, peer-reviewed academic journal and
to inform stakeholders of the results. The stakeholders for
this study are those who passed PL 111-216 and those
affected by it; namely, the U. S. Congress, the FAA, the
U. S. regional airlines, and the public.
Results
Article 1 of the Pilot Source Study 2015 (Bjerke et al.,
2016) analyzed the background characteristics of Part 121
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regional airline pilots hired since the enactment of PL 111216 (Post-Law pilots) and compared their background
characteristics to the Part 121 regional airline pilots hired
before the enactment of PL 111-216 (Pre-Law pilots).
Article 2 of the Pilot Source Study 2015 (Smith, G. et al.,
2016) determined how the background characteristics of
Post-Law pilots affected their performance (outcomes) at a
Part 121 regional airline by analyzing four outcome
variables: Non-Completions, Extra Training, Extra IOE,
and Extra Recurrent Training. This report (Article 3 of the
Pilot Source Study 2015) compares the pilot outcome
variables between the Pre-Law dataset and the Post-Law
dataset to determine whether the background variables had
a stronger or diminished effect on Post-Law outcomes.
Statistical analyses were conducted to determine (a) if there
was a difference in pilot training success since the enactment of the FOQ Rule, and (b) to determine which of the
background characteristics had more effect on these outcomes. Three outcome variables were comparable between
the Pre-Law dataset and the Post-Law dataset: Extra Training Events, Completions, and IOE z-Score. Insufficient data
were available to compare the Recurrent Training outcome
variable.
Background Variables—Overview
Figure 1 displays the significant differences between the
Pre-Law and Post-Law pilots with four demographic background variables: AABI-Accredited Flight Program, Aviation
Degree, Military Pilot, and CFI Certificate. The detailed
results are

N AABI Flight Degree is significantly different (N 5
10,912, x2(1) 5 122.15, p , .001, W 5 –.106, p , .001);
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with 32% of the Pre-Law pilots having AABI Flight
Degrees and only 23% of the Post-Law pilots having
AABI Flight Degrees,
N Aviation Degree is significantly different (N 5 10,631,
x2(1) 5 233.38, p , .001, W 5 –.148, p , .001); with
66% of the Pre-Law pilots having an Aviation Degree
and only 51% of the Post-Law pilots having an Aviation Degree,
N Military Pilot is significantly different (N 5 12,638,
x2(1) 5 380.97, p , .001, W 5 .174, p , .001); with
3% of the Pre-Law pilots being Military Pilots and 12%
of the Post-Law pilots being Military Pilots, and
N CFI Certificate is significantly different (N 5 12,806,
x2(1) 5 40.13, p , .001, W 5 –.056, p , .001); with
82% of the Pre-Law pilots having their CFI Certificate
and only 78% of the Post-Law pilots having their CFI
Certificate.
Figure 2 displays the significant differences between
Previous Experience for the Pre-Law and Post-Law pilots:
N 5 10,777, x2(2) 5 71.68, p , .001, Cramer’s V 5 .082,
p , .001. The pilots in the Post-Law data had an extensive
array of non-aviation related Previous Experience, including
small business owners, real estate professionals, lawyers,
mechanics, etc.; thus, many of the Post-Law pilots are likely
to be career changers. For Previous Experience, significant
differences were found for Corporate Pilots and Flight
Instructors.

N 15% of the Pre-Law pilots were Corporate Pilots and
20% of the Post-Law pilots were Corporate Pilots, and

N 53% of the Pre-Law pilots listed their Previous Experience as a Flight Instructor, and 46% of the Post-Law
pilots listed their Previous Experience as a Flight Instructor.

Figure 1. Significant demographic variables.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Previous Experience.

Significant differences were found between the Pre-Law
and Post-Law pilots in the experience background variables, Dual Given and Total Flight Hours. The mean of
Pre-Law Dual Given hours was 689; the mean of Post-Law
Dual Given hours was 940. The significant increase in Dual
Given hours could be attributed to PL 111-216; pilots used
flight instruction hours to bridge the extended gap and
to accrue sufficient flight hours to be hired by a Part 121
regional airline. The mean Pre-Law Total Flight Hours was
1,597; the mean Post-Law Total Flight Hours was 3,071.
The significantly higher Post-Law Total Flight Hours is a
direct result of PL 111-216.
Outcome Variable—Extra Training Events
Using an ANOVA, the Pre-Law pilots had significantly
fewer Extra Training Events (mean 5 .52; N 5 6,608)
compared to the Post-Law pilots’ Extra Training Events
(mean 5 1.20; N 5 5,118). The Levene test for homogeneity of variance was significant. The two groups had
unequal variances: W(1, 11, 184) 5 464.45, p , .001; therefore, the Brown-Forsythe test for unequal variances is
reported: F(1, 7,528) 5 240.52, p , .001 (see Figure 3).
The variable, Extra Training Events, was also tested as
the dependent variable using regression analyses. The
following independent variables were not able to predict
the number of Extra Training Events: College Degree,
Aviation Degree, Military Pilot, Previous Experience, CFI
Certificate, or Dual Given. The regression analysis was
significant for AABI Flight Degree and Total Flight Hours;
however, the value of R2 (5 .009) indicates that these
variables predicted less than 1% percent of the variance
for Extra Training Events. For all practical purposes,

regression analysis cannot help the airlines predict who will
require extra training.
A new dichotomous variable was created for Extra
Training Events; the new variable is Extra Training Events
Category, for which options are (a) zero extra training
events, or (b) one or more extra training events. Using the
chi-square test of significance, there was a significant
difference between the Pre-Law and Post-Law outcomes:
N 5 11,186, x2(1) 5 247.85, p , .001, W , .149, p , .001.
The Pre-Law pilots had more than expected zero Extra
Training Events, while the Post-Law pilots had more than
expected one or more Extra Training Events. Therefore, the
Post-Law pilots required significantly more extra training
(see Figure 4).
In the following figures, bolded borders indicate significance, a plus (+) sign indicates a positive outcome, and
the colors of the arrows indicate the result of the Pre-Law
and Post-Law comparison. A red arrow indicates a negative
effect and a green arrow indicates a positive effect from
Pre-Law to Post-Law. A solid arrow indicates a significant
effect to a significant effect, and a dashed arrow indicates a
non-significant effect to a significant effect, or a significant
effect to a non-significant effect.
Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events With
Background Variables
For the variables Pre-Law/Post-Law and Extra Training
Events, the new variable has four categories: Pre-Law: Zero
Extra Training Events, Post-Law: Zero Extra Training
Events, Pre-Law: One or More Extra Training Events, and
Post-Law: One or More Extra Training Events. The following sections will describe how the independent variables
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Figure 3. Increase in average Extra Training Events.

Figure 4. Extra Training Events with Pre-Law/Post-Law.

significantly influenced this new combined outcome variable,
Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.
College Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training
Events
Using the chi-square test of significance, College Degree
with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events was statis-

tically significant: N 5 11,090, x2(6) 5 37.953, p , .001;
Cramer’s V 5 .041, p , .001. Associate Degree increased
its negative effect on zero extra training between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with zero
extra training events. No Degree increased its negative
effect on one or more extra training events between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with
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one or more extra training events. The following cells had
significant contributions to the chi-square, as displayed in
Figure 5.

N For Post-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots
with an Associate Degree had significantly fewer zero
extra training events than expected: Observed 5 243
versus Expected 5 292.7; Chi-square contribution 5
22%.
N For Pre-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with an Associate Degree had significantly
more one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 170 versus Expected 5 140.8; Chi-square
contribution 5 16%.
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with No Degree had significantly more one or
more extra training events than expected: Observed 5
376 versus Expected 5 332.1; Chi-square contribution 5 15%.
Aviation Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training
Events
Using the chi-square test of significance, Aviation
Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events
was statistically significant: N 5 9,105, x2(3) 5 242.788,
p , .001; Cramer’s V 5 .163, p , .001. Therefore, Aviation Degree lost some of its positive effect on zero extra
training between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer

Post-Law pilots with zero extra training events. Aviation Degree increased its positive effect on one or
more extra training events between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with one or more
extra training events. The following cells had significant contributions to the chi-square, as displayed in
Figure 6.

N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
a Non-Aviation Degree had significantly fewer zero
extra training events than expected: Observed 5
1,042 versus Expected 5 1,331.7; Chi-square contribution 5 26%.
N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
an Aviation Degree had significantly more zero extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 2,138
versus Expected 5 1,848.3; Chi-square contribution
5 19% [positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with a Non-Aviation Degree had significantly
more one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 1,023 versus Expected 5 784.4; Chisquare contribution 5 30%.
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with an Aviation Degree had significantly fewer
one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 850 versus Expected 5 1,088.6; Chisquare contribution 5 22% [positive outcome].

Figure 5. College Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.
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Figure 6. Aviation Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.

AABI Flight Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra
Training Events
Using the chi-square test of significance, AABI Flight
Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events was
statistically significant: N 5 9,293, x2(3) 5 165.882, p ,
.001; Cramer’s V 5 .134, p , .001. Therefore, AABI Flight
Degree lost some of its positive effect on zero extra training
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law
pilots with zero extra training events. AABI Flight Degree
increased its positive effect on one or more extra training
events between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra training events. The
following cells had significant contributions to the chisquare, as displayed in Figure 7.

N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
a Non-AABI Flight Degree had significantly fewer
zero extra training events than expected: Observed 5
2,105 versus Expected 5 2,298.2; Chi-square contribution 5 10%.
N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
an AABI Flight Degree had significantly more zero
extra training events than expected: Observed 5
1,075 versus Expected 5 881.8; Chi-square contribution 5 26% [positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with a Non-AABI Flight Degree had signifi-

cantly more one or more extra training events than
expected: Observed 5 1,626 versus Expected 5 1,420.8;
Chi-square contribution 5 18%.
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with an AABI Flight Degree had significantly
fewer one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 340 versus Expected 5 545.2; Chi-square
contribution 5 47% [positive outcome].
Previous Experience With Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra
Training Events
Using the chi-square test of significance, Previous
Experience with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events
was statistically significant: N 5 9,579, x2(6) 5 163.385,
p , .001; Cramer’s V 5 .092, p , .001. Airline experience
increased its positive effect on zero Extra Training between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots
with zero extra training events. Airline experience lost
some of its positive effect on one or more extra training
events between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra training events.
Corporate experience decreased its negative effect on zero
Extra Training between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
more Post-Law pilots with zero extra training events.
Corporate experience increased its negative effect on
one or more extra training events between Pre-Law and
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Figure 7. AABI Flight Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.

Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with one or
more extra training events. Flight Instructor experience
increased its negative effect on zero Extra Training between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with zero extra training events. Flight Instructor experience
decreased its negative effect on one or more extra training
events between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra training events. The
following cells had significant contributions to the chisquare, as displayed in Figure 8.

N

N

N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots whose
primary Previous Employment was at an Airline had
significantly more zero extra training events than
expected: Observed 5 1,507 versus Expected 5 1,394;
Chi-square contribution 5 6% [positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots
whose primary Previous Employment was at an Airline had significantly more zero extra training events
than expected: Observed 5 927 versus Expected 5
827.2; Chi-square contribution 5 7% [positive outcome].
N For Pre-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was at an
Airline had significantly fewer one or more extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 286 versus
Expected 5 419.2; Chi-square contribution 5 26%
[positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events,
pilots whose primary Previous Employment was at an
Airline had significantly fewer one or more extra

N

N

training events than expected: Observed 5 427 versus
Expected 5 506.6; Chi-square contribution 5 8%
[positive outcome].
For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots
whose primary Previous Employment was in Corporate aviation had significantly fewer zero extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 608 versus
Expected 5 722.4; Chi-square contribution 5 11%.
For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was in
Corporate aviation had significantly more one or
more extra training events than expected: Observed 5
345 versus Expected 5 262.6; Chi-square contribution 5 16%.
For Post-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots
whose primary Previous Employment was Flight
Instructor had significantly fewer zero extra training events than expected: Observed 5 1,131 versus
Expected 5 1,262; Chi-square contribution 5 8%.
For Pre-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was Flight
Instructor had significantly more one or more extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 772 versus
Expected 5 639.5; Chi-square contribution 5 17%.

CFI Certificate With Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training
Events
Using the chi-square test of significance, CFI Certificate
with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events were statistically significant: N 5 11,186, x2(3) 5 58.93, p , .001;
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Figure 8. Previous Experience with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.

Cramer’s V 5 .073, p , .001. CFI Certificate lost some of
its positive effect on zero Extra Training between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with zero
extra training events. CFI Certificate increased its positive
effect on one or more extra training events between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
one or more extra training events. No CFI Certificate
increased its effect on zero extra training events between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots
with zero extra training events. No CFI Certificate lost
some of its effect on one or more extra training events
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law
pilots with one or more extra training events. The following
cells had significant contributions to the chi-square, as
displayed in Figure 9.

N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
No CFI Certificate had significantly fewer zero extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 747 versus
Expected 5 874.8; Chi-square contribution 5 32%.
N For Pre-Law—Zero Extra Training Events: Pilots with
a CFI Certificate had significantly more zero extra
training events than expected: Observed 5 3,828
versus Expected 5 3,700.2; Chi-square contribution
5 7% [positive outcome].
N For Pre-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with No CFI Certificate had significantly more

one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 339 versus Expected 5 285.5; Chi-square
contribution 5 17%.
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with No CFI Certificate had significantly more
one or more extra training events than expected: Observed 5 460 versus Expected 5 375.9; Chi-square contribution 5 32%.
N For Post-Law—One or More Extra Training Events:
Pilots with a CFI Certificate had significantly fewer
one or more extra training events than expected:
Observed 5 1,506 versus Expected 5 1,590.1; Chisquare contribution 5 8% [positive outcome].
Dual Given and Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training
Events
Using an ANOVA, the means for Dual Given with the
factor as Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events were
statistically significant: N 5 5,371, F(3, 5,371) 5 80.72,
p , .001; a significant difference exists among the four
categories. The Levene test for the homogeneity of variance
was significant, W(3, 5,371) 5 38.89, p , .001; therefore, the
Games-Howell post hoc tests for unequal variances were
used. Dual Given hours was less beneficial to regional airline training for Post-Law pilots. In the ANOVA post hoc
analysis, there were three important results (see Figure 10).
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Figure 9. CFI Certificate with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.

Figure 10. Dual Given with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.

N The Dual Given mean for the Post-Law: Zero Extra
Training Events (mean 5 908 hours, N 5 1,968) was
significantly higher than the Dual Given mean for the
Pre-Law: Zero Extra Training Events (mean 5 693
hours, N 5 1,768).
N The Dual Given mean for the Post-Law: One or
More Extra Training Events (mean 5 1,025 hours;

N 5 1,128) was significantly higher than the
Dual Given mean for Pre-Law: One or More
Extra Training Events (mean 5 675 hours, N 5
511).
N The Dual Given mean for the Post-Law: One or More
Extra Training Events (mean 5 1,025 hours; N 5
1,128) was significantly higher than the Dual Given
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mean for Post-Law: Zero Extra Training Events (mean
5 908 hours, N 5 1,968).
Total Flight Hours and Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training
Events
Using an ANOVA, the means for Total Flight Hours
with the factor as Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events
were statistically significant: N 5 11,008, F(3, 11,004) 5
348.21, p , .001; a significant difference exists among the
four categories. The Levene test for the homogeneity of
variance was significant, W(3, 11,004) 5 240.23, p , .001;
therefore, the Games-Howell post hoc tests for unequal
variances were used. In light of these results, the additional
Total Flight Hours required by the legislation did not have
a positive effect on extra training events. As Total Flight
Hours increased, the number of extra training events also
increased—the result is a significant positive correlation
(Spearman’s rho 5 .256, p , .001). In the ANOVA post hoc
analysis, there were two important results (see Figure 11).

N The Total Flight Hours mean for the Pre-Law: Zero
Extra Training Events (mean 5 1,647 hours, N 5 4,487)
was significantly lower than the Total Flight Hours
mean for Post-Law: Zero Extra Training Events (mean
5 2,896 hours, N 5 3,126).
N The Total Flight Hours mean for the Pre-Law: One or
More Extra Training Events (mean 5 1,439 hours, N 5
1,449) was significantly lower than the Total Flight
Hours mean for Post-Law: One or More Extra Training
Events (mean 5 3,103 hours, N 5 1,946).
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Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, the Pre-Law
pilots had significantly more Completions (mean 5 93.44%;
N 5 6,070) compared to the Post-Law pilots (mean 5
83.57%; N 5 5,514): N 5 11,584, x2(1) 5 281.991, p ,
.001, W 5 –.156, p , .001 (see Figure 12). The Pre-Law
pilots had more completions (Observed 5 5,672) than expected (Expected 5 5,386) and fewer non-completions (Observed 5 398) than expected (Expected 5 683). Comparing the
Pre-Law results with the Post-Law results, the Post-Law pilots
had fewer completions (Observed 5 4,608) than expected
(Expected 5 4,893) and more non-completions (Observed 5 906) than expected (Expected 5 621). Overall, the
Post-Law pilots have 9.87% fewer completions than the
Pre-Law pilots.
A discriminant analysis was conducted to determine the
extent to which the following variables could accurately
predict membership in the Completions groups (Yes or
No). For the independent variables AABI Flight Degree,
Aviation Degree, CFI Certificate, Total Flight Hours, Extra
Training Events, and a constant, the discriminant analysis
function will classify 78% of the original grouped cases.
Notably, the data have significant multivariate normality—
the independent variables are not normally distributed,
which violates one of the assumptions of discriminant
analysis (N 5 9,040, Box’s M(15, 4,812,135.8) 5 762.08;
p , .001); the violation of this assumption was expected
because three independent variables, AABI Flight Degree,
Aviation Degree, and CFI Certificate, are dichotomous

Figure 11. Total Flight Hours with Pre-Law/Post-Law Extra Training Events.
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Figure 12. Percent of pilots completing training.

variables. Inclusion of these dichotomous variables improved the discriminating function of the equation. The equation more accurately predicted membership in the Completions group than in the Non-Completions. For Completions,
83% of the cases were correctly predicted; for NonCompletions, 56% of the cases were correctly predicted.
The discriminant analysis function incorrectly classified
(misclassified) Completions for 17% of the cases; for NonCompletions, 44% of the cases were incorrectly classified.
One discriminant function was created with an eigenvalue
of .063, canonical correlation of .244, Wilks’ l 5 .940, p ,
.001. The computed discriminant function is displayed in
Equation 1. The strength of the coefficient for Extra Training Events provides confidence that the Extra Training
variable is the principal factor for Completions.
Completions ~{:125(AABI Flight Degree)
{:162(Aviation Degree){:164(CFI Certificate)
z:209(Total Flight Hours)
{:853(Extra Training Events)

ð1Þ

Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions With Independent
Variables
A new variable was created that combined the variables
Pre-Law/Post-Law and Completions. The new variable has
four categories: Pre-Law—Non-Completion; Post-Law—
Non-Completion; Pre-Law—Completion; and Post-Law—
Completion. The following sections describe how the
independent variables significantly influenced this new combined outcome variable, Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.
College Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, College Degree
with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions was statistically

significant: N 5 11,473, x2(6) 5 82.349, p , .001;
Cramer’s V 5 .060, p , .001. Bachelor’s Degree increased
its positive effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. No Degree and Associate Degree increased
their negative effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. Associate Degree increased its negative effect
on completions between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
fewer Post-Law pilots with completions. The following
cells had significant contributions to the chi-square, as
displayed in Figure 13.

N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with No
Degree had significantly more Non-Completions than
expected: Observed 5 221 versus Expected 5 155;
Chi-square contribution 5 34%.
N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with an Associate Degree had significantly more Non-Completions
than expected: Observed 5 127 versus Expected 5 84.8;
Chi-square contribution 5 26%.
N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with a
Bachelor’s Degree had significantly fewer NonCompletions than expected: Observed 5 529 versus
Expected 5 637.1; Chi-square contribution 5 22%
[positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots with an Associate
Degree had significantly fewer Completions than
expected: Observed 5 387 versus Expected 5 437.9;
Chi-square contribution 5 7%.

Aviation Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, Aviation
Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions was statistically significant: N 5 9,492, x2(3) 5 301.753, p , .001;
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Figure 13. College Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

Cramer’s V 5 .178, p , .001. Aviation Degree increased
its positive effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. Non-Aviation Degree increased its negative effect on non-completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. Aviation Degree lost its positive effect on
completions between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
fewer Post-Law pilots with completions. Non-Aviation
Degree increased its positive effect on completions
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more PostLaw pilots with completions. The following cells were
statistically significant in their contribution to the chisquare, as displayed in Figure 14.

N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with a
Non-Aviation Degree had significantly more NonCompletions than expected: Observed 5 534 versus
Expected 5 372.9, Chi-square contribution 5 23%.
N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with an
Aviation Degree had significantly fewer NonCompletions than expected: Observed 5 338 versus
Expected 5 499.1, Chi-square contribution 5 17%
[positive outcome].
N For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with a NonAviation Degree had significantly fewer Completions than expected: Observed 5 1,293 versus
Expected 5 1,661.3, Chi-square contribution 5
27%.

N For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with an Aviation
Degree had significantly more Completions than
expected: Observed 5 2,592 versus Expected 5 2,223.7,
Chi-square contribution 5 20% [positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots with a Non-Aviation Degree had significantly more Completions than
expected: Observed 5 2,089 versus Expected 5 1,899.9,
Chi-square contribution 5 6% [positive outcome].
N For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots with an Aviation Degree had significantly fewer Completions
than expected: Observed 5 2,354 versus Expected 5
2,543.1, Chi-square contribution 5 5%.
AABI Flight Degree With Pre-Law/Post-Law
Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, AABI Flight
Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions was statistically significant: N 5 9,691, x2(3) 5 184.064, p , .001;
Cramer’s V 5 .138, p , .001. AABI Flight Degree increased its positive effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. No-AABI Flight Degree increased its negative
effect on non-completions between Pre-Law and Post-Law—
yielding more Post-Law pilots with non-completions.
AABI Flight Degree lost its positive effect on completions
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer PostLaw pilots with completions. No-AABI Flight Degree
increased its positive effect on completions between

66

M. O. Smith et al.

/ Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering

Figure 14. Aviation Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots
with completions. The following cells were statistically
significant in their contribution to the chi-square, as displayed
in Figure 15.

N For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots with an AABI
Flight Degree had significantly fewer Completions
than expected, Observed 5 1,157 versus Expected 5
1,248.2, Chi-square contribution 5 4%.

N For Pre-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with an

N

N

N

N

AABI Flight Degree had significantly fewer NonCompletions than expected, Observed 5 54 versus
Expected 5 79.1, Chi-square contribution 5 4% [positive outcome].
For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with a NonAABI Flight Degree had significantly more NonCompletions than expected, Observed 5 786 versus
Expected 5 660.6, Chi-square contribution 5 13%.
For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with an
AABI Flight Degree had significantly fewer NonCompletions than expected, Observed 5 120 versus
Expected 5 245.5, Chi-square contribution 5 35%
[positive outcome].
For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with a Non-AABI
Flight Degree had significantly fewer Completions
than expected, Observed 5 2,591 versus Expected 5
2,832.7, Chi-square contribution 5 11%.
For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with an AABI
Flight Degree had significantly more Completions
than expected, Observed 5 1,294 versus Expected 5
1,052.3, Chi-square contribution 5 30% [positive
outcome].

Previous Experience With Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, Previous
Experience with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions was
statistically significant: N 5 9,882, x2(6) 5 75.142, p ,
.001; Cramer’s V 5 .062, p , .001. Previous Airline and
Corporate experience increased their negative effect
on non-completions between Pre-Law and Post-Law—
yielding more Post-Law pilots with non-completions. Previous Flight Instructor experience increased its positive effect on non-completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with noncompletions. Previous Corporate experience increased
its positive effect on completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with completions. Previous Flight Instructor experience lost its
positive effect on completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with completions. The following cells were statistically significant
in their contribution to the chi-square, as displayed in
Figure 16.

N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was with an Airline had
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Figure 15. AABI Flight Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

Figure 16. Previous Experience with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

significantly more Non-Completions than expected,
Observed 5 263 versus Expected 5 232.8, Chisquare contribution 5 5%.

N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was in Corporate aviation had significantly more Non-Completions than
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expected, Observed 5 162 versus Expected 5 120.4,
Chi-square contribution 5 19%.
For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots whose primary
Previous Employment was in Corporate aviation had
significantly fewer Completions than expected,
Observed 5 779 versus Expected 5 888.5, Chisquare contribution 5 18%.
For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots whose primary
Previous Employment was in Corporate aviation had
significantly more Completions than expected, Observed 5 709 versus Expected 5 628.5, Chi-square contribution 5 14% [positive outcome].
For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was Flight Instructor had
significantly fewer Non-Completions than expected,
Observed 5 276 versus Expected 5 347.8, Chisquare contribution 5 20% [positive outcome].
For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots whose primary
Previous Employment was Flight Instructor had significantly more Completions than expected, Observed 5 2,722 versus Expected 5 2567.1, Chi-square
contribution 5 12% [positive outcome].
For Post-Law—Completions: Pilots whose primary Previous Employment was Flight Instructor had significantly
fewer Completions than expected, Observed 5 1,727
versus Expected 5 1,815.9, Chi-square contribution 5 6%.

CFI Certificate With Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using the chi-square test of significance, CFI Certificate
with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions was statistically

significant: N 5 11,584, x2(3) 5 108.414, p , .001;
Cramer’s V 5 .097, p , .001. Having a CFI Certificate
increased its positive effect on non-completions between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with non-completions. Not having a CFI Certificate
increased its negative effect on non-completions between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots
with non-completions. Having a CFI Certificate decreased
its positive effect on completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with completions. The effects of not having a CFI Certificate were
eliminated for Post-Law completions. The following cells
were statistically significant in their contribution to the chisquare, as displayed in Figure 17.

N For Pre-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with No CFI
Certificate had significantly more Non-Completions
than expected, Observed 5 105 versus Expected 5
78.2, Chi-square contribution 5 8%.
N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with No CFI
Certificate had significantly more Non-Completions
than expected, Observed 5 283 versus Expected 5
177.9, Chi-square contribution 5 57%.
N For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with No CFI
Certificate had significantly fewer Completions than
expected, Observed 5 981 versus Expected 5
1,113.9, Chi-square contribution 5 15%.
N For Post-Law—Non-Completions: Pilots with a CFI
Certi4ficate had significantly fewer Non-Completions
than expected, Observed 5 623 versus Expected 5 728.1,
Chi-square contribution 5 14% [positive outcome].

Figure 17. CFI Certificate with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.
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Figure 18. Dual Given with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

N For Pre-Law—Completions: Pilots with a CFI Certificate had significantly more Completions than expected, Observed 5 4,691 versus Expected 5 4,558.1,
Chi-square contribution 5 4% [positive outcome].
Dual Given and Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using an ANOVA, the means for Dual Given with the
factor as Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions were statistically
significant: N 5 5,583, F(3, 5,579) 5 89.95, p , .001; a
significant difference exists among the four categories. The
additional Dual Given hours under Post-Law were less
beneficial to regional airline training; in fact, the completers
have fewer Dual Given hours than non-completers. The
Levene test for the homogeneity of variance was significant, W(3, 5,579) 5 71.68, p , .001; therefore, the GamesHowell post hoc tests for unequal variances were used. In
the ANOVA post hoc analysis, there were two important
results (see Figure 18).

N The Dual Given mean for the Post-Law NonCompletions (mean 5 1,125 hours) was significantly
higher than the mean for Pre-Law Non-Completions
(mean 5 821 hours). Dual Given in the Post-Law
Non-Completions group had significantly more Dual
Given hours than any of the other groups.
N The Dual Given mean for the Pre-Law Completions
(mean 5 678 hours) was significantly lower than the
Dual Given mean for the Post-Law Completions
(mean 5 939 hours). This result is not unexpected;
pilots used flight instructing hours to increase their
total flight hours to qualify under the FOQ Rule.

Total Flight Hours and Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions
Using an ANOVA, the means for Total Flight Hours
with the factor as Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions were
statistically significant: N 5 11,398, F(3, 11,394) 5
454.31, p , .001; a significant difference exists among the
four categories. The Levene test for the homogeneity of
variance was significant, W(3, 11,394) 5 315.88, p , .001;
therefore, the Games-Howell post hoc tests for unequal
variances were used. The higher Total Flight Hours,
required by PL 111-216, did not yield fewer noncompletions for Post-Law pilots. As the number of Total
Flight Hours increases, so do the proportion of noncompletions; the result is a significant positive correlation
(Spearman’s rho 5 .228, p , .001). In the ANOVA post
hoc analysis, there were two important results (see
Figure 19).

N The average Total Flight Hours for the Pre-Law NonCompletions (mean 5 2,012 hours) was significantly
lower than the average Total Flight Hours for PostLaw Non-Completions (mean 5 3,996 hours).
N The average Total Flight Hours for the Pre-Law
Completions (mean 5 1,567 hours) was significantly
lower than the average Total Flight Hours for the
Post-Law Completions (mean 5 2,894).
Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score With Background
Variables
For all of Pilot Source Study 2015, IOE z-Scores greater
than one standard deviation (+1 SD) were considered Extra
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Figure 19. Total Flight Hours with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

IOE. The IOE z-Scores were binned into a dichotomous
variable: Normal IOE 5 +1 SD or less; Extra IOE 5 more
than +1 SD. A new variable was created that combined the
Pre-Law/Post-Law variables with the IOE z-Score dichotomous variable to create a variable that had four options:
Pre-Law and Normal IOE, Post-Law and Normal IOE,
Pre-Law and Extra IOE, and Post-Law and Extra IOE.
Two background variables significantly influenced this
new combined outcome variable, Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE
z-Score, in the following ways.
AABI Flight Degree and Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score
Using the chi-square test of significance, AABI Flight
Degree with Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score was statistically significant: N 5 6,693, x2(3) 5 51.668, p , .001;
Cramer’s V 5 .088, p , .001. Having an AABI Flight
Degree lost some of its positive effect on Normal IOE
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law
pilots with Normal IOE. Not having an AABI Flight Degree
decreased its negative effect on Normal IOE between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots with
Normal IOE. Having an AABI Flight Degree increased its
positive effect on Extra IOE between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with Extra IOE. Not
having an AABI Flight Degree increased its negative effect
on Extra IOE between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
more Post-Law pilots with Extra IOE. The following cells
were statistically significant in their contribution to the chisquare, as displayed in Figure 20.

N For Pre-Law—Normal IOE: Pilots who have a NonAABI Flight Degree had significantly fewer Normal

IOE scores than expected, Observed 5 1,253 versus
Expected 5 1352.1, Chi-square contribution 5 14%.
N For Pre-Law—Normal IOE: Pilots who have an AABI
Flight Degree had significantly more Normal IOE
scores than expected, Observed 5 601 versus Expected 5 501.9, Chi-square contribution 5 38% [positive
outcome].
N For Post-Law—Extra IOE: Pilots who have a NonAABI Flight Degree had significantly more Extra IOE
scores than expected, Observed 5 458 versus Expected 5 411.3, Chi-square contribution 5 10%.
N For Post-Law—Extra IOE: Pilots who have an AABI
Flight Degree had significantly fewer Extra IOE
scores than expected, Observed 5 106 versus Expected 5 152.7, Chi-square contribution 5 28% [positive
outcome].
Total Flight Hours and Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score
Using an ANOVA, Total Flight Hours with Pre-Law/
Post-Law IOE z-Score were statistically significant: N 5
7,429, F(3, 7,425) 5 144.73, p , .001. The Levene test
for the homogeneity of variance was significant, W(3,
7,425) 5 131.88, p , .001; therefore, the Games-Howell
post hoc tests for unequal variances were used. In the
ANOVA post hoc analysis, the Total Flight Hours for each
category was significantly different from the other
categories. For both the Pre-Law and Post-Law pilots,
those pilots requiring Extra IOE have fewer flight hours
than pilots who have Normal IOE. The increase in Total
Flight Hours is approximately 1,000 flight hours between
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Figure 20. AABI Flight with Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score.

Figure 21. Total Flight Hours with Pre-Law/Post-Law IOE z-Score.

the Pre-Law average flight hours and the Post-Law average
flight hours (see Figure 21).
Discussion and Recommendations
The purpose of the Pilot Source Study 2015 was to
determine the impact of PL 111-216 and the subsequent

FOQ Rule on pilot hiring and training at U.S. regional
airlines. The results of the research have been presented in
three articles, concluding with this report. The Appendix is
a summary of the results of this report that determined, for
Part 121 regional airlines, whether the success of the PostLaw pilots was different from the success of the Pre-Law
pilots, considering the differences in their background
characteristics. In the Appendix, the summary of differences between Pre-Law/Post-Law background variables
(discussed in article 1) highlights the decrease in background characteristics, except in the Post-Law data, there
are more Military and Corporate Pilots and, of course, more
Dual Given hours and more Total Flight Hours, as a
consequence of PL 111-216. Concerning the differences in
outcomes at Part 121 regional airlines between Pre-Law/
Post-Law, Extra Training significantly increased, Completions significantly decreased, IOE z-Scores did not
significantly change, and there were insufficient data to
determine a change in Recurrent Training.
Multiple variables showed there were statistically significant differences between pilots hired before August 1,
2013 and those hired after that date. Pilots hired after PL
111-216 went into effect had fewer AABI-Accredited
Flight degrees, fewer aviation degrees, and included more
military-trained pilots. More pilots in the Post-Law group
worked as corporate pilots and fewer Post-Law pilots had
their CFI certificate and worked as a flight instructor prior
to joining the airline. An equivalent number of pilots worked as airline pilots before and after the law went into effect.
The only background variable that gave positive outcomes
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in fewer Non-Completions, Less Extra Training, and Less
Extra IOE was graduating from an AABI-Accredited Flight
program.
Quality of education and quality of flight training have
more of an impact than total flight hours. All three Pilot
Source Studies have shown that flight hours are not a
reliable predictor of performance by pilots. This research
suggests that bachelor’s degree graduates of AABI-Accredited Flight programs are more likely to be successful in air
carrier new-hire training programs and in airline qualifications, especially when they transition from college to airline
training without spending significant time away from the
profession. Based on the results of this study, it would
be beneficial to revisit how the FAA views structured
training programs such as AABI-Accredited Flight programs that follow a structured curriculum according to
industry/educator collaborated criteria (AABI, 2016). This
study demonstrated that graduates from AABI-Accredited
Flight programs perform as well as military-trained pilots
and should be granted the same FAA regulatory relief as
the 750-hour military reduction. If there is indeed a pilot
shortage at the regional airline level, a reduced flight
hour requirement for graduates from an AABI-Accredited
Flight program would permit airlines to hire well-trained
pilots earlier in their careers when they are statistically
capable of completing rigorous airline training programs
and requiring less extra training. Airlines seeking to
hire new pilots should place value on military pilots and
graduates from an AABI-Accredited Flight program.
Based on the results of this research, pilots graduating
from an AABI-Accredited Flight program had an increased likelihood of success in initial training and line
qualification.
Extra training events were used as an indication of pilot
competency and readiness for the rigors of Part 121 training. The average increased from .5 extra training events per
Pre-Law pilot to 1.2 extra training events per Post-Law
pilot. On average, pilots required more extra training after
the enactment of PL 111-216. Out of the 6,608 Pre-Law
pilots, 1,493 (22.59%) Pre-Law pilots had extra training
events ranging from one to 38. Out of the 5,118 Post-Law
pilots, 1,835 (33.25%) Post-Law pilots had extra training
events ranging from one to 45. To quantify, the Pre-Law
pilots had 3,182 extra training events and the Post-Law
pilots had 6,147 extra training events. The Post-Law pilots,
with extensively higher average total flight hours, required
2,965 more extra training events than the Pre-Law pilots.
The magnitude of this difference between Pre-Law and
Post-Law extra training events should be even larger
because Post-Law extra training events are underrepresented. When some regional airlines extended their PostLaw training footprint for all pilots, some extra training was
no longer identified as extra training in the extended
training footprint.

The coefficient for Extra Training Events in the discriminant function for Completions (Equation 1) is evidence
that Extra Training is the principal factor for Completions.
To determine if there was a difference in the effect of Extra
Training between Pre-Law and Post-Law Completions, an
ANOVA was calculated between the means for Extra Training Events with the factor as Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions. The means are statistically significant: N 5 11,055,
F(3, 11,051) 5 290.19, p , .001; indicating a significant
difference exists among the four categories. Pilots who
terminated (Pre-Law or Post-Law) had a higher mean for
Extra Training than pilots who successfully completed
training (Pre-Law or Post-Law). Pilots who successfully
completed training required less Extra Training (see
Figure 22).
Quantifying the actual cost of non-completions is important to the airlines and to stakeholders addressing pilot
training issues. The researchers requested participating airlines to provide specific training costs in order to estimate
the cost of non-completions.
Using the average of seven U.S. regional airlines who
shared training costs with the researchers, each pilot was
paid $43,082 per year (or $118 per day for each pilot) for
salary and benefits. The average cost of accommodations
during training (per diem, hotels, etc.) was $106 per day for
each pilot. From the airline data, the prorated airline cost
(instructors, simulators, staff, overhead, etc.) is $20,345 per
pilot.
The proportion of non-completer pilots in the Post-Law
dataset that exceeds the proportion of non-completer
pilots in the Pre-Law dataset is 9.87% (see Figure 12), or
544 additional pilots who did not complete training. From
the cost survey, the average non-completer pilot terminates in 53 training days (2.65 months)—yielding a total
cost of $38,464 for each non-completer pilot. The total
cost to Regional Airlines for the 544 additional Post-Law
non-completer pilots is $20,924,516; unfortunately, the
regional airlines received zero return on their investment from these additional pilots who did not complete
training.
Additional studies are needed to continue the research
presented in the Pilot Source Studies. The authors recommend a longitudinal study designed to determine the
success of the Post-Law new-hire pilot group. Additionally,
this study’s methodology could be expanded to business
aviation, major airlines, and other aviation-based services,
such as maintenance and air traffic control, to determine
whether the background of the employees (pilots, maintenance technicians, or air traffic controllers) makes a difference in their training and on-the-job performance.
Lastly, a follow-up study to the Pilot Source Study 2015
should be commissioned to determine the impacts that
airline pipeline and gateway programs have on hiring and
retention.
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Figure 22. Extra Training Events with Pre-Law/Post-Law Completions.

Conclusions
The original ‘‘Pilot Source Study 2010’’ was commissioned in February of 2010 in order to respond to a
question posed by the FAA in an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) (FAA, 2010, February 8).
The FAA specifically asked the question ‘‘Do graduates of
accredited aviation programs perform better in training?’’
In early 2010, there were no data compiled at the time to
answer that very specific question. A group of researchers
set out to mine the needed data from a convenience sample
of regional airlines, and then analyze the results collectively
(Smith et al., 2010). Since February of 2010, over 14,000
individual pilot records have been collected, coded, and
analyzed through the three different Pilot Source Studies
(2010, 2012, and 2015). In all three studies, pilots who
graduated from AABI-Accredited Flight programs performed significantly better in initial training than pilots
who did not graduate from AABI-Accredited Flight programs. This compilation and analysis of a large amount of
data allows for a definitive answer to the question posed by
the FAA—yes, graduates of AABI-Accredited Flight programs do perform better in training.
The other consistent finding in the Pilot Source Studies
(2010, 2012, and 2015) relates to the impact that total flight
hours has on performance in initial pilot training. All three
studies found that the groups of pilots who performed
significantly better in training had fewer than 1,500 total
flight hours. These results consistently affirm that the
number of flight hours is not associated with successful
performance in regional airline pilot training. The conventional conclusion is that the quality of training should be
used as an indicator of success. Though the Pilot Source

Study 2015 did not directly investigate training quality, the
data show that the U.S. military and AABI-Accredited
Flight programs produce pilots who are more successful.
The U.S. military and AABI-Accredited Flight programs
have four features that exemplify quality programs: (a) they
are guided by criteria that exceed FAA certificate requirements; (b) they operate in a highly structured and supervised
environment; (c) they are routinely evaluated by an external
agency; and (d) they consistently require disciplined flying.
The authors recommend a follow-on study to determine the
quality of all pilot training programs that includes at least
these four constructs: criteria or competencies, structured training, external evaluations, and disciplined flying.
Before PL 111-216, regional airlines could establish
distinctive criteria for hiring pilots and could train them to
their standards for safe and proficient operations. Contrary
to intent, PL 111-216 did not create highly successful
regional airline pilots; instead, it eliminated a group of
pilots from the pilot pool who had performed well in the
earlier Pilot Source Studies 2010 and 2012. The Pilot
Source Study 2015 supports the earlier results—pilots with
fewer than 1,500 total flight hours were more successful
than their counterparts with more total flight hours.
Ultimately, the airline bears responsibility for the pilots
they hire and train; this study provides empirical measures
to help airlines determine candidates who are likely to
succeed in the current airline training model. While ab
initio and gateway programs might be successful, a vital
component of the whole person is lost in a narrowly
focused training program. The Pilot Source Study 2015
demonstrates that the most successful regional airline
candidate is one who advanced to a regional airline within
four years after graduation; had an R-ATP with fewer than
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Figure 23. Timeline of pilot development from certificates to airline training.

1,500 total flight hours; and recently graduated from an
AABI-Accredited Flight program or at least had a
bachelor’s degree, preferably an aviation degree.
The goal of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111216) is to improve the safety of the American flying
public. It is a complex law with many sections; the Pilot
Source Study 2015 addresses only Section 216 ‘‘Flight
Crewmember Screening and Qualifications’’ and Section
217 ‘‘Airline Transport Pilot Certification.’’ By requiring
Part 121 first officers to have an ATP and 1,500 total flight
hours, the law essentially created a ‘‘Building Time’’ gap
between earning a Commercial Pilot certificate and being
hired by a Part 121 regional airline (see Figure 23).
Since existing data do not directly measure safety; it is
inferred in this study that pilot performance is linked to
safety. In the Pre-Law Pilot Source Studies 2010 and 2012,
many pilots earned Commercial Pilot certificates and were
hired by regional airlines with fewer than 1,500 total flight
hours; these pilots out-performed their classmates in terms
of completions and extra training events (Smith et al., 2010;
Smith et al., 2013). The Post-Law Pilot Source Study 2015
in essence studied the effects of the gap that was extended
by PL 111-216. The Pilot Source Study 2015 provides
empirical evidence that the experience gap, which resulted
from PL 111-216, was ineffectual in enhancing pilot
performance and, by inference, the safety of the American
flying public.
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Appendix—Summary of Results

PRE-LAW

POST-LAW

Significant Change

Descriptive Statistics Differences—BACKGROUND Variables
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
AABI Flight
Aviation Degree
Military Pilot
CFI Certificate
Previous-Corporate Pilot
Previous-Flt Instructor
Dual Given
Total Flight Hours

32%
66%
3%
82%
15%
53%
Mean 689
Mean 1597

AABI Flight
Aviation Degree
Military Pilot
CFI Certificate
Previous-Corporate Pilot
Previous-Flt Instructor
Dual Given
Total Flight Hours

23%
51%
12%
78%
20%
46%
Mean 940
Mean 3071

Decreased
Decreased
Increased
Decreased
Increased
Decreased
Increased
Increased

Mean 1.20
84%
88%

Increased
Decreased
NS

Descriptive Statistics Differences—OUTCOME Variables
Extra Training Events
Completions
Normal IOE z-Score

Mean .52
93%
87%

Extra Training Events
Completions
Normal IOE z-Score
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Background Effects on Extra Training Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Zero

NS

Negative

One or More

NS

Negative

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

College Degree

Background Variable

Zero

Positive

NS

One or More

NS

Positive

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Aviation Degree

Background Variable

Zero

Positive

NS

One or More

NS

Positive

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

AABI Flight Degree

Background Variable

Zero

Positive

More Positive

One or More

Positive

Less Positive

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Airline Experience

Background Variable

Zero

Negative

NS

One or More

NS

Negative

Corporate Experience

Effect
Associate Degree increased its negative effect
on zero extra training between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with zero extra training events.
No Degree increased its negative effect on
one or more extra training events between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding more
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra
training events.
Effect
Aviation Degree lost some of its positive
effect on zero extra training between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding fewer PostLaw pilots with zero extra training events.
Aviation Degree increased its positive effect
on one or more extra training events between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra
training events.
Effect
AABI Flight Degree lost some of its positive
effect on zero extra training between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding fewer PostLaw pilots with zero extra training events.
AABI Flight Degree increased its positive
effect on one or more extra training events
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
fewer Post-Law pilots with one or more
extra training events.
Effect
Airline experience increased its positive
effect on zero Extra Training between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding more PostLaw pilots with zero extra training
events.
Airline experience lost some of its positive
effect on one or more extra training events
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
more Post-Law pilots with one or more
extra training events.
Effect
Corporate experience decreased its
negative effect on zero Extra Training
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
more Post-Law pilots with zero extra
training events
Corporate experience increased its negative
effect on one or more extra training events
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
more Post-Law pilots with one or more extra
training events.
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TABLE
(Continued)
Background Effects on Extra Training Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

NS

Negative

One or More

Negative

NS

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Zero

Positive

NS

One or More

NS

Positive

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Effect

Zero

693 hours

908 hours

One or More

675 hours

1,025 hours

Dual Given lost some of its effect. More flight
instruction hours were less beneficial to
Regional Airline training for Post-Law
pilots.

Extra Training Events

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Effect

Zero

1,647 hours

2,896 hours

One or More

1,439 hours

3,103 hours

Total Flight Hours lost some of its effect. The
additional Total Flight Hours required by the
legislation is not beneficial to regional airline
training. As Total Flight Hours increased,
the number of extra training events also
increased —the result is a significant
positive correlation.

CFI Certificate

Background Variable

Dual Given

Background Variable

Total Flight Hours

Flight Instructor experience increased its
negative effect on zero Extra Training
between Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding
fewer Post-Law pilots with zero extra
training events.
Flight Instructor experience decreased its
negative effect on one or more extra training
events between Pre-Law and Post-Law—
yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with one or
more extra training events.

Zero
Flight Instructor
Experience

Background Variable

Effect

Effect
CFI Certificate lost some of its positive effect
on zero Extra Training between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with zero extra training events.
CFI Certificate increased its positive effect on
one or more extra training events between
Pre-Law and Post-Law —yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with one or more extra
training events.

Background Effects on Completions Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

No

NS

Positive

No

NS

Negative

No

NS

Negative

Yes

NS

Negative

College Degree

Effect
Bachelor’s Degree increased its positive
effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law
pilots with non-completions.
No Degree increased its negative effect on
non-completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding more Post-Law pilots with
non-completions.
Associate Degree increased its negative effect
on non-completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law pilots
with non-completions.
Associate Degree increased its negative effect
on completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
completions
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TABLE
(Continued)
Background Effects on Extra Training Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

No

NS

Positive

Yes

Positive

Negative

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Aviation Degree

Background Variable

Airline Experience

Background Variable

AABI Flight Degree increased its positive
effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law
pilots with non-completions.
AABI Flight Degree lost its positive effect on
completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
completions.

Positive

More Positive

Yes

Positive

Negative

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

No

NS

Negative

Yes

NS

NS

Airline experience increased its negative
effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law
pilots with non-completions.
----

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Effect

No

NS

Negative

Yes

Negative

Positive

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Corporate Experience

Background Variable

Effect

No
AABI Flight Degree

Background Variable

Effect
Aviation Degree increased its positive effect
on non-completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with non-completions.
Aviation Degree lost its positive effect on
completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
completions.

No

NS

Positive

Yes

Positive

Negative

Flight Instructor
Experience

Effect

Corporate experience increased its negative
effect on non-completions between Pre-Law
and Post-Law—yielding more Post-Law
pilots with non-completions.
Previous Corporate experience increased its
positive effect on completions between PreLaw and Post-Law—yielding more PostLaw pilots with completions.
Effect
Flight Instructor experience increased its
positive effect on non-completions between
Pre-Law and Post-Law—yielding fewer
Post-Law pilots with non-completions.
Flight Instructor experience lost its positive
effect on completions between Pre-Law and
Post-Law—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots
with completions.

Background Effects on Completions Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

No

NS

Positive

Yes

Positive

NS

CFI Certificate

Effect
CFI Certificate increased its positive effect on
non-completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
non-completions.
CFI Certificate decreased its positive effect
on completions between Pre-Law and PostLaw—yielding fewer Post-Law pilots with
completions.
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TABLE
(Continued)
Background Effects on Extra Training Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

Dual Given

Background Variable

Total Flight Hours

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Effect

No

821 hours

1,125 hours

Yes

678 hours

939 hours

Dual Given lost some of its effect. More flight
instruction hours were less beneficial to
regional airline training for Post-Law pilots;
in fact, the completers have fewer dual-given
hours than non-completers.

Completion

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Effect

No

2,102 hours

3,996 hours

Yes

1,567 hours

2,894 hours

Total Flight Hours lost some of its effect. The
additional Total Flight Hours required by the
legislation is less beneficial to regional
airline training for Post-Law pilots. As the
number of Total Flight Hours increases, so
do the proportion of non-completions—the
result is a significant positive correlation.

Background Effects on IOE Between Pre-Law and Post-Law
Note: NS 5 Not Significant
Background Variable

IOE

Pre-Law Outcome

Post-Law Outcome

Normal

Positive

NS

Extra

NS

Positive

AABI Flight Degree
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